The long-term interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are being damaged by the Israel–Iran conflict.
China has been one of the few countries to side with Iran by publicly condemning Israel’s strikes on Iranian nuclear sites and military targets as a violation of Iran’s sovereignty and urging immediate de-escalation of the conflict.
As the outrages of Iranian proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis have captured the attention of the world in recent years, China has become increasingly isolated over its overt support for Iran, which has included jump-starting Iranian nuclear research capabilities in the early 1980s.
The reality is that China is protecting its significant investments in Iran, on both the economic and diplomatic fronts. By some estimates, China has invested at least $40 billion in Iran since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, with emphasis on building Iran’s energy infrastructure that facilitates the export of Iranian oil and gas to energy-poor China.
On the diplomatic front, China was among the first countries to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran on Feb. 14, 1979. Since then, Beijing has cultivated diplomatic relations with Tehran through nonalignment and noninterference policies in the final years of the U.S.–Soviet Cold War and beyond, a stance that resonated in Tehran.
China’s significant investments in Iran could be at risk or at least be problematic for the CCP on the diplomatic front. Let us examine the issue.
China and Iran Since 1979
The previously nonexistent relations between Iran and China began to blossom after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It is no coincidence that pariah countries seem to find each other and do business together, in one way or another. Iran has been the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism for 39 years, according to the U.S. State Department. The Chinese regime has practiced cultural genocide and forced organ harvesting for decades.
Be that as it may, the relationship started slowly and followed an upward trajectory that paralleled China’s economic and military expansion and outreach, which greatly accelerated under Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Some of the highlights:
China shifted away from supporting global communist revolutions in favor of “diplomatic pragmatism” and economic modernization in the 1980s. In Iran’s case, this meant withdrawing support from the communist Tudeh Party in favor of state-to-state diplomatic relations.
China provided approximately $2 billion worth of military hardware to Iran during the Iran–Iraq War (1980 to 1988), including 107-millimeter rockets, aircraft, main battle tanks, and surface-to-air missile systems.
In 1984, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center was opened with Chinese assistance, which included technical support for the installation of a 30-kilowatt Miniature Neutron Source Reactor, a Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor, a Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor, a Fuel Fabrication Laboratory for producing experimental nuclear fuel, and a Zirconium Production Plant for manufacturing alloys used in nuclear reactors, all of which were vital for Iranian nuclear research.
China signed a covert nuclear agreement, formalized in 1990, to provide Iran with technical assistance and expertise needed to expand Iranian nuclear infrastructure, including uranium mining, enrichment, and nuclear research.
After having been one of Iran’s main arms suppliers through the 1990s, China ceased signing new arms export agreements with Iran in 2005 to align with international sanctions and various U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran. However, past arms sales agreements were honored through 2015 while Iran shifted to domestic production of various Chinese weapons systems, such as the HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile, with Chinese assistance.
On the bilateral trade front, in 2004, Iran signed a 25-year agreement with China’s oil giant Sinopec Group worth a projected $70 billion for the development of its oil and gas industry.
By 2005, China had become the second-largest exporter to Iran by supplying 8.3 percent of its imports. By 2009, the Tehran Times reported that “China became Iran’s premier trading partner, with bilateral trade worth 21.2 billion dollars.”
As part of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, China agreed to assist in modernizing Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor in support of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear enrichment under the provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In 2016, China and Iran signed the roadmap for a 25-year “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” that focused on improving energy, infrastructure, regional security cooperation, and overall trade relations between the two countries. This was concluded during Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s trip to Tehran in January 2016.
In 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement focused on international trade in goods, Iranian oil exports to China, and Chinese investments in Iran. The CCP’s goals in Iran aligned with its Belt and Road Initiative: to develop overseas markets for finished Chinese goods while obtaining direct access to raw materials (mainly oil and gas) needed by Chinese industries. Alignment with Iran served the CCP’s geostrategic intentions by positioning the Chinese regime as an alternative to the United States in the evolving global order, particularly in the Middle East.
In 2023, China gained significant prestige in the Middle East by brokering a deal to restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which enabled the reopening of embassies in Riyadh and Tehran.
On June 14, in a show of Beijing’s continuing strong diplomatic support for the Iranian regime, China’s U.N. ambassador, Fu Cong, condemned Israel’s military actions against Iran.
Concluding Thoughts
The Chinese regime has much to lose depending on the outcome of the Israel–Iran conflict. As the largest buyer of Iranian oil, China imports more than 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports. Any disruption of the flow of those exports through the Strait of Hormuz, whether through blockage or severe damage to Iran’s oil infrastructure, would be a significant blow to China’s economy.
Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure highlight the significant Chinese support for Iran’s nuclear research and development capabilities. While ostensibly developed for what Tehran calls the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center has long been suspected of contributing to Iran’s covert nuclear weapons program, and the Chinese regime was the main player in jump-starting Isfahan when France ended its technical support after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Did any of the more than 1,000 Chinese nationals who left Iran after the Israel–Iran conflict began on June 13 have any involvement in Iran’s nuclear programs?
Finally, in pursuit of its goal to displace the United States in the Middle East, China would lose significant diplomatic leverage with the Gulf Cooperation Council states if Beijing sides with Tehran in a major way.
