China Showcases Weapons at Military Parade—New Tech or Just Knockoffs?

By Shen Zhou The Epoch Times

Beijing on Sept. 3 rolled out tanks, missiles, and warplanes in a grandiose military parade at Tiananmen Square, touting its display of “new” weaponry. But a closer look reveals that most of these so-called breakthroughs of China’s People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) weaponry were either repackaged versions of older systems or crude knockoffs of Russian and American designs.

Far from impressing the world—and especially the United States—the parade instead exposed the real limits of China’s defense technology.

‘Flagship’ Missiles? More Like Rebadged Models

The missiles hyped as Beijing’s “strategic flagship” weapons included the air-launched Jinglei-1, the submarine-launched JL-3, and the land-based DF-61. A closer examination indicates that these are updates to existing models rather than breakthroughs in innovation.

Jinglei-1

Jinglei, whose acronym is JL, meaning “thunderbolt” in Chinese, was marketed as a long-range nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). In fact, the JL-1 is little more than a modified DF-21.

With credibility eroding after corruption scandals in the PLA’s Rocket Force, Beijing has resorted to keeping the air-launched variant alive to give H-6N bombers—its “latest” bomber aircraft—some nuclear role. Chinese state-run media Global Times touted a 4,970-mile range, which is overly exaggerated. The realistic range is between 1,864 miles and 2,485 miles, according to Western media.

JL-3

The acronym in JL-3 stands for Julang, meaning “big wave” in Chinese. JL-3 is China’s latest submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that can reach 6,200 miles with three warheads.

However, the PLA Navy’s 094 subs can only carry 12 of them due to their bulk sizes, as seen in the parade. By contrast, U.S. Ohio-class subs carry 24 Trident II missiles, each with a 7,500-mile range and up to eight warheads. China’s designs remain heavily influenced by outdated Soviet/Russian technology, and the gap with the United States is glaring.

DF-61

Presented as a replacement for the DF-41, the new model looked nearly identical—essentially a rebranded upgrade. The DF-41 has been discussed in military circles since 1997, with repeated claims by Chinese authorities that it is operational. Yet it was absent from major parades in 2015, 2017, and again this year, prompting speculation that the much-hyped DF-41 fell short of expectations, leading to this cosmetic switch.

Together, these “new” systems highlight persistent shortcomings in China’s missile technology, particularly in propulsion. Despite talk of “flagship” weapons, Beijing is still relying on oversized, outdated designs, including its liquid-fueled DF-5C, which was not even showcased at the parade.

Tanks and Ground Systems

The display of ground forces was no more reassuring.

China’s latest Type-100 tank made its debut at the parade. Still, it was positioned behind the upgraded Type-99B, which state media cited an expert describing as the real front-line system with “strong combat and survival capabilities.” The Type-100, with its 105 mm gun, is more of a light tank.

Global Times claims the Type 100 tank and its accompanying infantry fighting vehicle are designed for rapid deployment, deep tactical strikes, and urban combat, suggesting they are intended for use in street fighting during a potential invasion of Taiwan.

Officers are seen in the hatch of a Type 99 main battle tank as it rolls during a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II, in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on Sept. 3, 2025. (Pedro Pardo/ AFP via Getty Images) — Officers are seen in the hatch of a Type 99 main battle tank as it rolls during a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II, in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on Sept. 3, 2025. Pedro Pardo/ AFP via Getty Images

Other ground assets—the PLA Navy Marine Corps‘ amphibious infantry vehicles, rocket artillery, and armored cars—showed few real upgrades, underscoring China’s continued weakness in combined-arms capabilities, especially close air support.

Copycat Aircraft

The airpower segment followed a similar pattern. China rolled out its KJ-600 carrier-based early warning aircraft, a copy of the U.S. Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye, “down to details,” according to the think tank Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Alongside it were carrier-based fighters such as the J-15 (a derivative of a rejected Russian design) and the new J-35, which Beijing claims can rival the F-35 but almost certainly cannot match its stealth or strike capabilities.

Imitation Drones

Unmanned systems made a strong showing at the parade. Still, nearly all bore a striking resemblance to their American counterparts.

Whether it’s the so-called new strike-recon drones, loyal wingman drones, or shipborne unmanned helicopters, their designs look a lot like those already in service or tested by the U.S. military. But when it comes to crucial specs such as speed and payload, they’re almost certainly a long way behind.

Most of these drones aren’t the disposable types seen constantly on the Russia–Ukraine battlefield. They’re more expensive, reusable models, but with lighter payloads. Figuring out how to control them effectively over long distances is still a new challenge for the Chinese regime.

China’s Type 076 amphibious assault ship has been fitted with catapults for drones, but its role at sea remains unclear. The regime seems fixated on copying U.S. technology—such as drones, counter-drone weapons, or even land-based robot dogs—yet it’s doubtful that it truly grasps the operational concepts behind them.

Unmanned Naval Copycats

The United States has developed a wide range of unmanned surface ships, while its underwater drones are rarely seen in public. China, eager to imitate, has rolled out its own versions of unmanned ships and submarines. But it’s doubtful that the Chinese fully understand the systems inside or how to actually use them effectively.

During the recent parade, the Chinese navy showcased several unmanned underwater vehicles and boats on trucks, claiming that they can operate using artificial intelligence and perform autonomous attacks. However, the risk is that if these systems malfunction, they could potentially turn against their own side.

Concluding Thoughts

The missiles and other hardware the Chinese regime rolled out were all offensive weapons, exposing the emptiness of Beijing’s “peaceful, defensive” rhetoric. But whether these weapons actually work as advertised is a big question mark.

At the same time, China’s defensive systems remain weak. Its air-defense missiles—copies of Russia’s S-300 and similar to Iran’s—struggle to intercept U.S. missiles or airstrikes, a fatal flaw that can’t be fixed.

In the end, the parade didn’t intimidate the world as intended. Instead, it highlighted the Chinese military’s shortcomings and stirred more resentment than respect.

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