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Some Chinese analysts were taken by surprise by the Trump administration’s Venezuela operation.

Beijing Rethinking Taiwan Plan After Maduro’s CaptureThe dramatic U.S. military operation in Venezuela on Jan. 3 that resulted in the capture and extradition of Nicolás Maduro has produced broad international backlash and sharp condemnations, especially from China, Russia, and Iran.

Beijing, for example, labeled the operation a “violation of international law” and a threat to Venezuelan sovereignty, vehemently urging for Maduro’s release and a halt to what it called U.S. “hegemonic behavior.”

For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), this event is not merely a geopolitical spat over Venezuela. It ripples across strategic planning assumptions about U.S. operational willpower, international norms, and the potential costs China might incur for its plans to “reunify” Taiwan with the mainland by 2027. That’s next year, by the way, and U.S. intelligence views that timeframe as likely for Beijing to make a move against Taiwan, as does CCP leader Xi Jinping.

US Shows a Willingness to Conduct Unilateral Military Operations Without Broad Global Support

Of course, China’s state media and official statements have framed the U.S. action in Venezuela as a breach of sovereignty and international law, emphasizing the violation of the U.N. Charter and potential revival of a kind of Monroe Doctrine.

With various security agreements and alliances in the region—including with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and India—U.S. behavior in the region has typically been bound by alliance structures and legal norms. From Beijing’s perspective, the fact that the United States executed and publicly justified a special operation without prior multilateral backing is deeply unsettling. If Washington is willing to move on its own with decisive force, Chinese planners must reassess assumptions about the thresholds for U.S. military commitment—including in the Indo-Pacific and over Taiwan.

What Will the CCP’s Response Be?

The CCP’s response has been predictable and resolute—at least on paper. In terms of public pronouncements, Beijing has decided to take the rhetorical offensive, particularly regarding its plans for reunification with Taiwan.

On Jan. 7, Chen Binhua, a spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, said that China opposes “Taiwan independence” separatist activities and external interference, in what is undoubtedly a direct reference to the United States, and pledged to advance the cause of national reunification in 2026. Chen then said, “The wheels of history are rolling on toward national reunification and national rejuvenation.”

That message was undoubtedly intended for Taiwanese authorities, Chinese military officials, the Chinese people, and, of course, the Trump administration.

But what of the CCP’s military plans for Taiwan? Are they still credible?

The answer is likely in Chen’s official statement: “The complete reunification of the motherland must be and will surely be realized.”

CCP’s Credibility Is on the Line

It could be interpreted, and rightly so, that Xi Jinping and the CCP authorities know that the U.S. operation, combined with Xi’s proclamation that China will be ready to reunify Taiwan by 2027, puts their own credibility in the spotlight.

After all, if the United States can blatantly invade a China ally on another continent, kidnap the leader and take over the country in a couple of hours, including taking control of Chinese-financed infrastructure, why can’t Xi deliver on his oft-repeated promise to take over Taiwan, a “renegade province” that’s less than 100 miles offshore?

In other words, the world is watching not only what the United States is doing in Venezuela, but what Beijing will do about it.

So far, aside from official condemnations, Beijing’s response has been minimal. What’s more, the United States is now in a position to deny China access to Venezuelan oil purchases, a major source of Venezuela’s debt repayment to China.

If Beijing is unable or unwilling to counter this more aggressive U.S. foreign policy, it stands to lose stature and influence in the world, among both allies and adversaries. It could reasonably be argued that, for the moment, it already has. Whether in Latin America or in Southeast Asia, the message is that China cannot guarantee security against a determined U.S. military move.

That could reshape alliance calculations that Beijing hoped would deter Washington from escalating conflicts elsewhere. As a result, Cuban and Iranian leaders, among others, are likely wondering if they’re next on the Trump administration’s hit list even as you read this.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (R) and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yvan Gil (L) attend a meeting at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on May 12, 2025. (Florence Lo/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (R) and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yvan Gil (L) attend a meeting at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on May 12, 2025. Florence Lo/Pool/AFP via Getty Images

Venezuela a Wake-Up Call to Beijing

However, it is also the case that Venezuela is nothing short of a wake-up call for Chinese military planners. They’re reevaluating the intentions, the will, and the capabilities of the United States to reassert its dominance in international affairs on a more power-based manner rather than the established rules-based system that’s been in place and enforced by the United States itself since the end of World War II.

That’s a fair criticism, but there are caveats to that critique as well. For instance, the Chinese regime has taken advantage of the system for decades by ignoring trade laws, flouting currency agreements, engaging in intellectual property theft on an industrial scale, using slave labor, carrying out forced organ harvesting, and engaging in human and drug trafficking, among other violations of the rules-based system.

Understandably, China’s military planners are already reevaluating their assumptions and military requirements to adapt to the new reality of American power projection. At this moment, the difference between the CCP’s global influence and that of the United States is the willingness to use military power to defend itself against drug trafficking, terrorism, and other actions that threaten its people and its global position, whereas Beijing has yet to do so overtly.

If nothing else, the Venezuela operation is making the CCP and the world rethink their assumptions about U.S. resolve and military capabilities, as well as its ability to ignore global reactions to unilateral military action.

Undoubtedly, Beijing is making new risk assessments concerning its 2027 plans for Taiwan.

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