It takes megatons of chutzpah, or gall, for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its diplomats to carry on as if the world doesn’t know that it is responsible for assisting and enabling Iran’s campaign of ballistic missile and drone terror attacks in the current Iran war.

On March 9, China’s special envoy for the Middle East Issue, Zhai Jun, met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary-General Jasem Al-Budaiwi, and according to Arab News that day, Al-Budaiwi “expressed appreciation for China’s condemnation of Iranian attacks on GCC states.”

This was the first time a Chinese official had condemned something in the war other than the United States or Israel, but then, during a March 11 Chinese foreign ministry briefing, spokesman Guo Jaikun stated, “China does not go along with attacks against countries in the Gulf region and condemns indiscriminate attacks against civilians or non-military targets.”

After decades of supporting the terrorist Mullah regime in Tehran, China appears to be now willing to criticize Iran’s “indiscriminate attacks” against its neighbors, an ever-so-slight crack in the door of culpability, for enabling the Iranian terror regime to impose suffering on Iranians and their neighbors, especially Israel.

The United States has been tracking China’s missile technology assistance and missile sales to Iran since the mid-1980s.

This began a long China–Iran missile and missile technology relationship that included the sale of M-7 short-range ballistic missiles, provision of Chinese missile engineers, extensive training of Iranian missile engineers, and the export of Chinese missile-making material such as rocket-making materials, computerized machine tools, gyroscopes, and other guidance systems, and both liquid and solid rocket fuels.

More recently, China has been sanctioned by the United States for selling solid rocket motor ingredients to Iran; the U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned six entities and six individuals from China and Iran, according to an April 29, 2025, press release, “for their role in a network procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).”

Then on March 7, 2026, The Washington Post reported that two Iranian container ships had departed the Chinese port of Gaolan in the city of Zhuhai, a main chemical export location, noting these ships “probably carrying a key precursor for rocket fuel.”

Iran’s cheap one-way loitering long-range attack drones have constituted most of the “missiles” used by Iran to terrorize the Gulf states, and these “poor-man’s cruise missiles” rely extensively on Chinese electronic and engine components.

On the X social media platform on March 2, 2026, pro-China technology commentator “tphuang,” responding to a comment about how U.S. and Israeli missile defenses were working against Iran’s missiles and drones, wanted to assure readers that China had an endless supply of drone components, saying:

“One of many Chinese factories making low speed engine for drones is fully booked until Nov. This one [image posted] produces 30k engines per day… One of many suppliers. These are not high end engines, but good enough to fly to their destination 1 time & are super cheap + easy to make.”

On May 5, 2024, the British newspaper Express reported that British defense ministry scientists examining an Iranian Arash-2 one-way loitering attack drone captured in Israel’s Negev Desert found that it contained “Chinese guidance systems.”

The Arash-2 has a range of 800 to 1,200 miles and is one of a large variety of Iranian long-range attack drones, such as the more famous Shahed-136. It is likely that Chinese guidance and engine components have been used in most of the 2,300 Iranian drones used in this latest conflict.

The CCP’s longstanding assistance to Iran’s missile capabilities has enabled Iran’s most recent campaign of missile terror, starting in reaction to the Feb. 28, 2026, commencement of the U.S. Operation Epic Fury and the Israeli Operation Rising Lion.

Israeli and U.S. military operations followed five rounds of Iran–U.S. negotiations in which Iran refused to end its nuclear weapons program, and the determination that Iran had already shifted its nuclear weapons program to new underground shelters, and admission from Iranian negotiators that they were close to building 10 nuclear weapons.

From Feb. 28 to March 13, Iran launched 2,700 drones, 1,196 ballistic missiles and 28 cruise missiles, for a total of 3,924 missile strikes, causing the following casualties: U.S. military forces, 10 dead, 140 wounded; Israel, 12 dead; United Arab Emirates (UAE), 6 killed, at least 130 wounded; Saudi Arabia, 2 killed, 12 wounded; and Oman, 2 killed, 10 wounded.

But Iran’s missile and drone attacks quickly grew into a region-wide terror campaign, striking civilian targets to cause casualties, seeking to divide the Gulf states from their military partnership with the United States.

Also disturbing is the high likelihood that the Chinese regime is helping Iran to guide and target its ballistic missiles and drones.

Commenting on the X platform on Feb. 2, 2026, analyst Shivan Mahendrarajah stated:

While it is not possible to confirm this assertion from open sources, it is true that Yaogan and Jilin are known Chinese surveillance satellite families that can be used for precision targeting of ballistic missiles and drones.

Also, to enable precision guidance, Iran’s Chinese-produced guidance systems for ballistic missiles and drones would have access to navigation signals from China’s BeiDou navigation satellite constellation.

Further disturbing news was reported by Reuters on Feb. 24, citing “six sources” noting that the Chinese regime was negotiating to sell Iran the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s CM-302, an export variant 180-mile range supersonic speed anti-ship missile, derived from the 300-mile range YJ-12B in service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

Though the prospect now seems remote, should the Iranian terror regime reconstitute and survive, China may be tempted to start airlifting missiles and/or their components to enable Iran to extend this war.

So when the CCP’s special envoy comes knocking, it would be appropriate to request a full report on all of Beijing’s assistance for Iran’s ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone programs. Additionally, it is prudent to inquire whether the CCP intends to rearm Iran with more advanced missiles and if Chinese surveillance and navigation satellites are guiding Iranian missile strikes.

Better yet, don’t wait for Beijing’s denials and obfuscations; simply present the special envoy with a bill of reparations for the lives lost and damages done.